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Abstract
If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of
expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of
their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it
is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available
ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules
share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation),
they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also
necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do
not hold for small electorates.
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1 Introduction
One of the reasons advocated for extending the set of ballots available to the voters
is to allow them to represent more accurately the intensity of their preferences for
the various candidates. Consider for instance Evaluative Voting (EV ). Under EV ,
the voter evaluates each candidate independently on the same numerical scale, the
grades are added and the candidate with the largest total is elected. Baujard and
Igersheim (2010) [2] and Baujard et al. (2012) [1] report on field work on EV with
various scales, and observe that voters often say that they appreciate the possibility
of voicing their opinions more finely than what a uni-nominal vote allows.
Evaluative Voting is an extension of Approval Voting (AV ), which can be consid-
ered as EV with the simple scale {0, 1}. And AV is itself an extension of Plurality
Voting1 (PV ), in the sense that a voting rule V ′ is an extension of a voting rule V
if all the ballots available under V are available under V ′.
But does extending the set of ballots available under a given voting rule modify
the set of voting equilibria? For instance, Dhillon and Mertens (1999) [9] study the
“Relative Utilitarianism” mechanism, according to which voters grade alternatives
and the voter’s grades are summed after re-scaling to the interval [0, 1]. They write:
“Except possibly with very small sets of voters, voters will clearly find that, for their
votes to have a maximal effect, they should assign either 0 or 1 to every alternative.
Hence the corresponding direct mechanism seems to be ‘approval voting’.” Indeed,
assuming strategic voting, one might suspect that the set of voting equilibria should
often not be altered by such an extension.
We shall verify this intuition for large electorates. However, it need not be always
the case that extending the set of ballots has no strategic implications. For instance,
AV is an extension of PV and, as shown by Myerson and Weber (1993) [24], AV
improves the aggregation of preferences when compared with PV in the noteworthy
divided majority situation.
We here focus on additive voting rules, in which a ballot is a list of points that the
1EV is obviously related to Utilitarianism; see Karni (1998) [13], Dhillon and Mertens (1999)
[9], Segal (2000) [31], d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002) [7] and Gaertner and Xu (2012) [10] who
called it Range Voting, for axiomatic analyses. AV is often advocated since it emerged in the
literature in the mid 70s; see Laslier and Sanver (2010) [17] for a detailed account. In an election
held under PV , a voter is allowed to give at most one point to at most one candidate and the
candidate with the most votes wins the election. The most common rule for direct presidential
elections is Plurality with a Runoff (Blais (1997) [3]), but we here restrict attention to one-round
voting systems.
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voter is affording to the candidates, and where points for each candidate are simply
added. (A formal definition of this family of voting rules is provided in the next
section.) We analyze the issue in the framework of strategic voting, that is assuming
that voters strategically cast their votes in order to maximize their (expected) utility.
We study equilibria and consider that two voting rules are strategically equivalent if
they have the same equilibrium outcomes.
Strategic incentives in large and small electorates may differ and have been mod-
eled in different ways. To study small electorates, we use a standard refinement of
Nash equilibrium (perfectness) and provide an example that shows that voters need
not overstate at equilibrium.
To tackle the problem on large elections, we focus on one of the first and sim-
plest models in this direction, proposed by Myerson and Weber (1993) [24]2. In
this model, for any pair of candidates, the voter considers that there is a positive
probability that her vote is pivotal on this pair, but some of these probabilities are
vanishingly small compared to others. We first define the notion of strategically
equivalent voting rules. Two equilibria of elections held under two different rules
are equivalent if and only if the winning candidates are the same ones and voters’
strategies can be justified by the same sequence of pivot probabilities. Two vot-
ing rules are strategically equivalent if and only if to each equilibrium for one rule
corresponds an equivalent equilibrium for the other rule.
We then derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategic equivalence
of voting rules. The sufficient condition is simple. Say that a ballot is extremal if it
is not abstention-like (the ballot does not treat all candidates alike) and it cannot be
expressed as a mixture of other available ballots. Notice that “casting an extremal
ballot” does not here mean voting for a candidate at some extreme point of the
political spectrum, it means voicing a (maybe moderate) political opinion in the
strongest possible way.
If two voting rules offer the same set of extremal ballots, up to a homothetic
transformation, then they are strategically equivalent. The use of this sufficient
condition is fairly straightforward, implying several interesting consequences.
The first consequence is that Approval Voting and Evaluative Voting are strategi-
cally equivalent. The second consequence concerns a different family of voting rules.
In an election held under Cumulative Voting (CV ), another natural extension of
Plurality Voting, a voter is endowed with a finite number of points, and he is al-
2Other models of large electorates have been proposed: Palfrey (1989) [28], Laslier (2000) [14],
Myerson (2000) [22] and McKelvey and Patty (2006) [18].
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lowed to distribute them freely between the different candidates. Different authors3
have discussed such a method. With such a voting rule, voters have the possibility
of choosing an extremal ballot: that is to give the highest possible amount of points
to only one of the candidates. We prove that this is indeed the case in equilib-
rium, implying that PV and CV are strategically equivalent. We hence prove that
for both PV and AV , there exist extensions that do not modify the set of voting
equilibria.
A related question is to know whether extending a voting rule, and hence giving
more flexibility to the voters, necessarily leads to a better preference aggregation.
Such is the case with PV and AV in the examples of Myerson and Weber (1993) [24].
Call robust the voting rules whose set of equilibria remains unaltered by any finite
extension. As we will see, provided that the maximal score that can be attached
to a candidate is bounded, for any voting rule U , there must exist an extension V
such that the set of extremal ballots of V coincide with the set of extremal ballots
of EV with the maximum number of points. Due to the sufficient condition, V and
EV are strategically equivalent. Therefore, giving more flexibility might modify
the set of equilibria, however, the limit of such extensions is strategically equivalent
to EV with the maximum number of points and therefore to AV . Therefore, the
more flexibility a voting rule allows to voters, the more it becomes similar, from a
strategic point of view, to Approval Voting.
As far as the necessary condition is concerned, we prove that the existence of a
homothetic transformation is necessary for strategic equivalence if we restrain the
allowed voting rules to be rank, or positional, scoring rules. A rank scoring rule
(as axiomatized by Young (1975) [34]) is characterized by a vector of weights to be
assigned to each of the candidates, non-abstention ballots being all the permutations
of this vector. The candidate(s) with the highest number of votes is (are) declared
the winner(s) of the election. For instance, PV , Borda Count and Negative Voting
are rank scoring rules whereas AV is considered as a non-rank scoring rule, since
such a permutation does not exist. The reason of this simple necessary condition
is the structure of positional rules, any extremal ballot being a permutation of the
same vector. In full generality, that is without imposing some further structure to
the rules, a tractable necessary condition seems to be hard to obtain.
The described equivalence between voting equilibria is valid along the lines of
the theory of large elections proposed by Myerson and Weber (1993) [24]. Small
3See Sawyer and McRae (1962) [30], Brams (1975) [5], Nitzan (1985) [25], Cox (1990) [6] and
Gerber et. al (1998) [11].
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elections (that is elections with few voters) raise new questions. For instance, the
information available to voters might be much more detailed in a small election than
in a mass election, implying that a theory such as Myerson and Weber’s one is of
scant interest for small electorates. In order to investigate whether the previous
claims still hold in environments with few voters, we discuss a voting situation in
the case of Evaluative Voting.
In the example that we study, the strategy combination is a mixed-strategy equi-
librium in which the unique pure strategy best response for a voter is not extremal.
Indeed, one of the voters of the election mixes between his undominated strategies
making uncertain the final electoral outcome for the rest of the voters. The “mixing”
removes the weak preference for overstatements. Furthermore, the strategy profile
is a perfect equilibrium a` la Selten (1975) [32]. This situation proves that the lack
of overstatement can be a best response even in equilibria that satisfy different equi-
libria refinements. The refinement (trembling-hand perfection) used in this work
is among the most classical ways of obtaining equilibria as a limit of games with
small uncertainty (i.e. perturbed games). However, it should not be too difficult to
generalize the results to settings in which the uncertainty comes from other sources.
For instance, Bayesian games with some uncertainty about voters’ types or common
values’ settings with imperfect information about the true state of nature are good
candidates for models in which extremal voting is not always a best response for a
strategic voter.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basics of the model.
Section 3 to 5 are devoted to large elections: Section 3 describes the equilibrium
concept, Section 4 states the sufficient and necessary conditions for strategic equiv-
alence, Section 5 presents the strategic equivalence between the above-mentioned
voting rules and contains the results on the robustness of a voting rule. Section
6 presents the results concerning the environments with few voters, and Section 7
provides some concluding comments.
2 The setting
The finite set of voters is denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}. Each voter has a type t
that determines his preferences over the set of candidates K = {c1, c2, . . . , ck}. The
preferences of a voter with type t (a t-voter) is defined by ut = (ut(ci))ci∈K, in which
ut(ci) denotes the utility a t-voter gets if candidate ci wins the election. Voters’
utilities are assumed not to be constant across all candidates. All types t belong to
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a finite set of types T . The distribution of types is denoted by r = (r(t))t∈T with∑
t r(t) = 1, in other words, r(t) represents the share of t-voters.
In this work, we stick to the comparison of additive rules: a ballot is a vector
b = (b1, b2, . . . , bk) where bi is a positive integer that denotes the number of points
given to candidate ci, to be added to elect the candidate with the largest score. We
assume that the number of points is bounded, i.e. there exists some positive real
number M such that bi ≤ M for every i. Each voter must choose a ballot b from a
finite set of possible ballots denoted by B.
Hence, a voting game is characterized by (N , T ,K,B, r). Among additive vot-
ing rules, we will pay special attention to Evaluative, Cumulative, Approval, and
Positional rules.
Under Evaluative Voting with m points, a voter can assign up to m points to
each candidate. Hence:
b is an EV m ballot if ∀ cj ∈ K, bj ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}.
Similarly, an Approval Voting (AV ) ballot consists of a vector that lists whether
each candidate has been approved or not: for each cj ∈ K , bj ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, AV
is a particular case of EV m with m = 1.
In an election held under Cumulative Voting with m points, a voter can assign
up to m points to each candidate, with the restriction that the sum of the points he
assigns to the candidates is at most m:
b is an CV m ballot if ∀cj ∈ K, bj ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}, and
∑
cj∈K
bj ≤ m.
In an election held under Plurality Voting (PV ) voters can abstain or give one
point to at most one candidate. Hence, PV is a particular case of CV m with m = 1.
Formally, we can write, with obvious notation:
BEVm = {0, 1, . . . ,m}K, BAV = BEV 1 ,
BCVm =
b ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}K : ∑
cj∈K
bj ≤ m
 , BPV = BCV 1 .
Following Myerson (1999) [21], a rank scoring rule (a positional voting rule) U in
a k-candidates election is characterized by some list of numbers b = (b1, , b2, . . . , bk)
such that b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bk = 0, and the ballots are all the permutations of b. For
instance, Plurality voting is such that b1 = 1 and bj = 0 for any j 6= 1. Similarly,
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the Borda rule satisfies bj =
k−j
k−1 . Negative voting belongs to this family as bk = 0
and bj = 1 for any j 6= k. Such rules play an important role in social choice theory
and were early characterized by Smith (1973) [33] and Young (1975) [34].
Note that both EV m for any m and CV m for m > 1 are non-rank scoring rules
as it is not be the case that all ballots in the ballot set are permutations of the same
vector. Central to this paper is the following concept:
Definition 1. A voting rule V is an extension of the voting rule V ′ if all ballots in
V ′ are available in V , i.e.
BV ′ ⊂ BV .
For instance, given a finite m, EV m is an extension of CV m as BCVm ⊂ BEVm .
Similarly, Approval Voting is an extension of Plurality Voting.
3 Large Elections
We assume that each voter maximizes his expected utility to determine which ballot
in the set B he will cast. In this model, his vote has an impact in his payoff if
it changes the winner of the election. Therefore, a voter needs to estimate the
probability of these situations: the pivot events. We say that two candidates are
tied if their vote totals are equal. Furthermore, let H denote the set of all unordered
pairs of candidates, we denote a pair {ci, cj} in H as ij with ij = ji.
For each pair of candidates ci and cj, the ij-pivot probability pij is the probability
of the outcome perceived by the voters that candidates ci and cj will be tied for first
place in the election. A voter perceives that the probability that he will change
the winner of the election from candidate ci to candidate cj by casting ballot b with
bi ≥ bj to be linearly proportional to bi−bj, and that the constant of proportionality
(the ij-pivot probability) is the same for the perceived chance of changing the winner
from j to i if bj ≥ bi 4.
4This is roughly equivalent to assume that the probability of candidates ci and cj being tied
for first place is the same as the probability of candidate ci being in first place one point ahead of
candidate cj (and both candidates above the rest of the candidates), which is in turn the same one
as the probability of candidate cj being in first place one vote ahead of candidate ci. Myerson and
Weber (1993) [24] justify this assumption by arguing that it seems reasonable when the electorate
is large enough. This is not verified in Poisson games, a formal model of large elections in which
the pivot probabilities are derived endogenously from the structure of the game.
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A vector listing the pivot probabilities for all pairs of candidates is denoted by
p = (pij)ij∈H . This vector p is assumed to be identical and common knowledge
for all voters in the election. A voter with ij-pivot probability pij anticipates that
submitting the ballot b can change the winner of the election from candidate cj to
candidate ci to be pij max{bi − bj, 0}.
A (voting) strategy is a probability distribution σ over the set B that summarizes
the voting behavior of voters of each type. For any ballot b and any type t, σ(b | t)
is the probability that a t-voter casts ballot b. Let σ(· | − t) stands for the strategy
profile of the voters with types different from t. The expected utility gain from
casting ballot b equals the expected utility of casting ballot b minus the expected
utility of abstaining. Focusing on utility gains simplifies notation. The expected
utility gain of a t-voter when he plays the strategy σ(· | t) equals Et[σ(· | t) | p] where
p is the common vector of pivot probabilities. Slightly abusing notation, we let
Et[b | p] denote the expected utility gain of a t-voter from casting ballot b, that is he
plays the pure strategy b with:
Et[b | p] =
∑
ij∈H
(bi − bj) · pij · [ut(ci)− ut(cj)]. (1)
Given the strategy combination σ, the share of the electorate who cast ballot b
is denoted by
τ(b) =
∑
t∈T
r(t)σ(b | t),
hence, the expected score of candidate ci is
S(ci) =
∑
b∈B
biτ(b).
The score vector S = (S(ci))ci∈K describes the expected score of each candidate in
the election. The set of likely winners W (K) of the election contains the candidates
whose expected score S(ci) is maximal given the strategy σ.
Myerson and Weber (1993) [24] assume that voters expect candidates with lower
expected scores to be less likely serious contenders for first place than candidates
with higher expected scores. In other words, if the expected score for some candidate
ci is strictly higher than the expected score for some candidate cj, then the voters
would perceive that candidate ci’s being tied with any third candidate cl is much
more likely than candidate cj’s being tied for first place with candidate cl.
Definition 2. Given a voting strategy σ and any 0 < ε < 1, a pivot probability
vector p satisfies the ordering condition for ε given σ if, for every three distinct
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candidates ci, cj and cl:
S(ci) > S(cj) =⇒ pjl ≤ εpil.
Besides, Myerson and Weber (1993) [24] assume that the probability of three
(or more) candidates being tied for first place is infinitesimal in comparison to the
probability of a two-candidate tie.
Given a pivot probability vector p, the set of pure best replies of t-voters is as
follows:
BRt(p) = {b ∈ B | b ∈ arg max
d∈B
Et[d | p]}.
Given a strategy combination σ, the support of σ for t-voters denotes the set of
pure strategies (ballots) played with positive probability by t-voters according to σ:
Suppt(σ) = {b ∈ B | σ(b | t) > 0}.
Definition 3. The strategy σ is a voting equilibrium of the game if and only if, for
every positive number ε, there exists a vector pε of positive pivot probabilities that
satisfies, given σ, the ordering condition and such that, for each ballot b and for each
type t,
b ∈ Suppt(σ) =⇒ b ∈ BRt(pε).
It should be stressed that, in this definition, the pivot probabilities pεij are sup-
posed to be the same when the voter contemplates casting one ballot or the other.
This point will play an important role in the next section. It is justified when the
number of voters is large for, in that case, the voter cannot change with his single
vote the order of magnitude of these probabilities. It can be shown that the set of
equilibria is non-empty5.
Dividing the positive vector pε by the sum of its components, one obtains a prob-
ability distribution qε = (qεij)ij∈H over the set H of pairs of candidates. Note that q
ε
still satisfies the ordering condition. The component qεij represents the conditional
probability of a pivot between candidates ci and cj in the event of a pivot between
any two candidates in the election. Myerson and Weber (1993) [24] remark that, in
an equilibrium, qεij can have a strictly positive limit when ε tends to 0 only if one of
these conditions holds: either both ci and cj are the front-runners of the election or
5See Theorem 1, page 105 in Myerson and Weber (1993) [24].
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one of these two candidates is the front-runner and the other has the second highest
expected score.
Finally, an important concept in our model should be defined: the equivalence
between equilibria under different voting rules.
Definition 4 (Equivalence of Equilibria). An equilibrium σU of an election held
under a voting rule U is equivalent to an equilibrium σV of the same election held
under V if and only if they are justified by the same sequence of pivot probability
vectors and the winning set is identical.
Definition 5. Two voting rules are strategically equivalent if and only if their set
of voting equilibria are equivalent, that is if for any equilibrium of the election held
under one rule there exists a equivalent equilibrium under the other.
A possible winner is a candidate who wins the election in equilibrium with pos-
itive probability. The set of possible winners of an election held under the voting
rule V is denoted:
WV = {ci ∈ K | There exists an equilibrium σ in which S(ci) is maximal}.
If two voting rules are strategically equivalent, then they have the same set
of possible winners. However, the converse needs not be true; for instance, the
rankings of other candidates may differ. It is noteworthy that the definition of
strategic equivalence used is rather demanding. It requires more than the set of
possible winners being the same under two voting rules. This demanding definition
reinforces our results as we show that this strong version of equivalence holds in the
Myerson-Weber setting.
4 Strategic equivalence
We now introduce some categories of ballots that will be useful throughout.
An abstention ballot is a ballot with all the coordinates alike; the set of such
ballots is denoted by Abs(B).
An interior ballot b is a ballot which is not an abstention ballot and that can
be expressed as a strict convex combination of other ballots in B, i.e. there exist
ballots
b1, b2, . . . , bm ∈ B with b =
∑
i
αib
i with αi ∈ (0, 1) and
∑
i
αi = 1.
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An extremal ballot is a ballot which is neither an interior nor an abstention ballot.
Given the set of ballots B, the set of interior and extremal ballots are respectively
denoted by Int(B) and Ext(B) with,
Ext(B) = B \ (Int(B) ∪ Abs(B)).
Letting ∆(B) the set of convex combinations of ballots in B, the extremal ballots
correspond to the extreme points of ∆(B) minus any abstention ballots.
We need to make the following technical assumption concerning the ballot set:
there exists for any type of voters a ballot in the set of ballots B that delivers a
positive expected utility to this type.
Regular Ballot Sets: A ballot set B is regular if for, for every type t and for
every positive pivot probability vector pε, there exists a ballot b∗ ∈ B that ensures
a positive utility gain to t-voters: Et[b
∗ | pε] > 0.
Assuming regular ballot sets is not too restrictive. For instance, it suffices to see
that a sincere ballot under a rank scoring rule (and also under CV m and under EV m)
gives a strictly positive expected utility to voters. Recall that, by assumption, voters’
utilities are not constant across candidates. Assume that some voter’s preferences
are as follows ut(c1) > ut(c2) > . . . > ut(ck). Voting sincerely implies to vote b =
(b1, b2, . . . , bk−1, 0) with bi ≥ bi+1. By (1), Et[b|pε] =
∑
ij∈H(bi−bj)pεij[ut(ci)−ut(cj)].
As (bi−bj) ≥ 0 with i < j, with at least one inequality being strict, then Et[b|pε] > 0
as wanted. We assume throughout that the ballot set B is regular.
Lemma 1. Neither an abstention ballot nor a ballot which is a convex combination
of at least one abstention ballot are cast with positive probability in equilibrium.
Proof. We let ax denote an abstention ballot with ax = (x, . . . , x) for some positive
x. For any ε > 0, by (1), Et[a
x | pε] = 0 for any pε.
The regularity of the ballot set directly implies that any strategy combination σ
in which an abstention ballot is cast with positive probability is not an equilibrium.
Indeed, as the ballot set is regular, there exists a ballot b∗ ∈ B such that Et[b∗ |pε] >
0 = Et[a
x | pε] for any pε. Therefore, ax 6∈ BRt(pε) which implies that ax 6∈ Suppt(σ)
in any equilibrium σ.
It remains to be proven that a ballot which is a convex combination of at least one
abstention ballot is not cast with positive probability in equilibrium. Let c be such a
ballot with c = αxa
x+
∑
i∈D αid
i. Ballot c is the convex combination the abstention
ballot ax and of ballots di in some subset D ⊆ B with ∑i∈D∪{x} αi = 1 with αi ≥ 0
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for any i ∈ D ∪ {x}. Therefore, for any ε > 0, Et[c | pε] =
∑
i∈D αiEt[d
i | pε] as
Et[a
x | pε] = 0. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium σ with c ∈ Suppt(σ).
Suppose first that Et[c |pε] ≤ 0 with respect to σ. By the regularity of the ballot
set, there exists a ballot b∗ ∈ B such that Et[b∗ | pε] > 0. But then Et[b∗ | pε] > 0 ≥
Et[c | pε], so that c 6∈ BRt(pε). Therefore, σ is not an equilibrium.
Suppose now that Et[c | pε] > 0 with respect to σ. By definition, there exists a
ballot b∗ ∈ B such that Et[b∗ | pε] > 0 for any pε. Let σˆ(· | t) stand for the mixed
strategy of t-voters such that σˆ(b∗ | t) = αx and for any di ∈ D, σˆ(di | t) = αi.
Therefore, σˆ is a well-defined mixed strategy with
Et[σˆ(· | t) | pε] = αxEt[b∗ | pε] +
∑
i∈D
αiEt[d
i | pε]
> αxEt[a
x | pε] +
∑
i∈D
αiEt[d
i | p] = Et[c | pε].
Therefore, as Et[σˆ(· |t) |pε] > Et[c |pε], then c 6∈ BRt(pε). Therefore, we can conclude
that σ is not an equilibrium.
Remark 1.
The definition of an interior ballot implies that if a ballot c is interior then it is
the strict convex combination of extremal and abstention ballots:
c =
∑
b∈B′
αb · b for someB′withB′ ⊂ Ext(B)∪Abs(B) with αb ∈ (0, 1) and
∑
b∈B′
αb = 1.
Remark 2.
The set Ext(B) of extremal ballots is non-empty for any non-constant voting
rule. To see this suppose that Ext(B) = ∅ for some voting rule with ballot set B.
By definition, B = Ext(B) ∪ Int(B) ∪ Abs(B). As B is finite, not every ballot can
be expressed by a convex combination of other ballots in B, so that B 6= Int(B). As
we have assumed that Ext(B) = ∅, we must have that Abs(B) 6= ∅, i.e. every ballot
which is not interior is an abstention ballot. Hence, every ballot of such a rule is
an abstention ballot as any interior ballot is a strict convex combination of other
ballots. Thus, such a voting rule can be labeled as constant as it elects for any vote
distribution the whole set of candidates.
Example 1.
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Consider a three-candidates election held under CV m with m = 2. Each voter is
endowed with at most two points that can be freely distributed among the different
candidates. The set of allowed ballots BCVm is:
BCVm = {(0, 0, 0),(2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 0, 2),
(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}.
The interior ballots are:
Int(BCVm) = {(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}.
(To see this, it is enough to write that for instance the interior ballot (1, 1, 0) equals
the convex combination 1/2(2, 0, 0) + 1/2(0, 2, 0).) There is a unique abstention
ballot:
Abs(BCVm) = {(0, 0, 0)}.
Finally, the set of extremal ballots is:
Ext(BCVm) = {(2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 0, 2)}.
4.1 Extremal Voting
By Lemma 1, an abstention ballot is not cast with positive probability in equilibrium,
so that there are two types of equilibria: interior and extremal. We refer to an
interior equilibrium whenever an interior ballot is included in the support of a voter’s
strategy. Formally, the equilibrium σ is interior if there exists t ∈ T such that
Int(B) ∩ Suppt(σ) 6= ∅. On the contrary, an extremal equilibrium is an equilibrium
in which the support of every voter’s strategy uniquely includes extremal ballots.
The following Proposition proves that for any interior equilibrium, there exists
an equivalent extremal one. The logic of the proof is as follows. We start with
an interior equilibrium in which at least one type of voters cast an interior ballot.
We then build an equivalent equilibrium in which the support of this type of voters
only includes overstating ballots. As the construction does not depend on the initial
interior equilibrium, one can iteratively apply this construction until no type of
voters casts an interior ballot. It hence follows that for any interior equilibrium, there
must exist an equivalent equilibrium in which the support of every voter uniquely
includes extremal ballots, an extremal equilibrium.
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Proposition 1. [Strategic Overstating] Let U be a voting rule. For any interior
equilibrium, there exists an equivalent extremal equilibrium.
Proof. Let σ = (σ(· | t), σ(· | − t)) be an interior equilibrium such that the t-voter’s
strategy satisfies σ(c | t) = 1 with c being an interior ballot. Similar arguments
can be used to extend the proof whenever σ involves that t-voters play in mixed
strategies.
As c is an interior ballot, we can write c =
∑
i∈D αid
i, that is c is a convex
combination of ballots di in some subset D ⊆ B with ∑i∈D αi = 1 with αi > 0
for any i ∈ D. By Remark 1, the set D uniquely includes abstention and extremal
ballots. Furthermore, Lemma 1 entails that only extremal ballots belong to D as
otherwise there is a contradiction with σ being an equilibrium.
Formula (1) implies that, given σ, for any ε > 0, there exists a positive pivot
probability vector pε such that
Et[c | pε] = Et[
∑
i∈D
αi · di| pε] =
∑
i∈D
αi · Et[di | pε].
In other words, given pε, the t-voter is indifferent between the strategy σ(· | t) (i.e.
voting c) and the “mimicking” strategy γc(· | t) with γc(di | t) = αi for all di ∈ D.
We have proven so far that a t-voter is indifferent between casting ballot c (as
in σ) or playing the mixed strategy γc(· | t) that uniquely involves extremal ballots.
Hence, given σ(·|−t), we have proven that γc(·|t) is a best response for t-voters. Note
that as c is a convex combination of ballots di in some subset D ⊆ B, each di ∈ D
is in BRt(p
ε) as otherwise there is a contradiction with σ being an equilibrium.
Denote by Γ = {γc(· | t), σ(· | − t)} a strategy in which types t′ 6= t play according
to σ. In order to prove that Γ is an equilibrium, we need to prove that any t′-voter
with t′ 6= t is playing a best response. However, as the scores of the candidates are
unchanged when t-voters switch from playing strategy σ(· | t) to strategy γc(· | t),
the same pivot probability vector pε justifies both strategy combinations. Therefore,
the set of best responses of t′-voters BRt′(pε) is unchanged as it only hinges on the
pivot probability vector. Therefore, any t′-voter is playing a best response in the
strategy combination Γ, proving that Γ is an equilibrium
If type t is playing a mixed strategy σ(·|t), it suffices to apply the above argument
to each interior ballot c played with positive probability and to take as the mixed
strategy mimicking σ(· | t) the average of γc(· | t), according to σ.
All in all, both σ and Γ are justified by the same pivot probability vector and
under both of them, the expected scores of the candidates coincide. Hence, for any
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equilibrium σ in which the t-voters cast an interior ballot, there exists an equivalent
equilibrium Γ in which they only cast extremal ballots.
As the argument does not hinge neither on the type t nor on the strategies
played by the rest of the voters, one can repeat the same argument in equilibrium γ
if some voter plays an interior ballot with positive probability. Hence, by iteratively
applying this argument, one can prove that for any interior equilibrium, there exists
an equivalent extremal one.
4.2 A Sufficient Condition for Strategic equivalence
Proposition 1 proves that interior equilibria are not informative in the sense that
they do not add any information regarding the equilibria that can be attained under
a voting rule. Building on such a result, we now give a simple sufficient condition
to ensure the strategic equivalence of two voting rules.
Adding the same constant to every candidate in a ballot obviously does not
change anything, so we normalize rules in the following way. Let U be a voting rule
with ballot set BU . Let N : B → B the normalizing transformation which brings to
0 the minimal grade in any ballot: (N(b))j = bj − mini∈Kbi for all j. Denote by
N(U) the normalized version of U with ballot set N(BU). We omit the proof of the
following result:
Proposition 2. Any voting rule U is strategically equivalent to its normalized ver-
sion N(U).
From now on, we concentrate on normalized rules. As will be shown, the strategic
equivalence of two rules depends on their extremal ballots. Recall that a homothetic
transformation is a transformation H : X → Y of the form H(x) = s + tx is with
both s, t real numbers, t > 0. Two vectors x and y are homothetic if there exists
a homothetic transformation between them. Similarly, two sets are homothetic
if every pair of vectors in X and Y are homothetic. A dilation is a homothetic
transformation with s = 0.
Theorem 1. If there exists a homothetic transformation between the sets of extremal
ballots of two normalized voting rules U and V , then U and V are strategically
equivalent.
Proof. Let U and V denote two voting rules such that there exists a transformation
f : b 7−→ f(b) = α + βb, from Ext(BU) onto Ext(BV ), for some reals α, β with
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β > 0. As both U and V are normalized, we know that every ballot b ∈ BU ∪ BV ,
has positive coordinates, the smallest one being 0. Hence, α = 0.
Let σU be a strategy in an election held under U in which every voter only casts
ballots in the set Ext(BU). Let σV denote a strategy in the same election held under
V that satisfies
σV (b
∗ | t) = σU(b | t), ∀ t ∈ T , (2)
in which each ballot b∗ satisfies b∗ = f(b) = βb. Hence, in the strategy combination
σV , every voter only casts ballots in the set Ext(BV ).
The scores of the candidates SU(·) given σU and SV (·) given σV satisfy
SV (ci) = βSU(ci) ∀ ci ∈ K,
and hence the scores of candidates coincide up to an homothetic transformation
under both strategies.
Let us now prove that if σU is an equilibrium then the strategy σV is an equilib-
rium with σU and σV being equivalent.
As σU is an equilibrium, there exists a vector p
ε = (pεij)ij∈H with p
ε
ij > 0 for
every ij ∈ H and every ε > 0 that satisfies the ordering condition for every ε > 0.
Furthermore, pε justifies σU . As under both σU and σV the relative scores of the
candidates coincide, the same vector pε satisfies the ordering condition for both
strategies for any ε > 0. Hence, it remains to be proven that pε justifies the strategy
σV .
Therefore, we have that, for every ε > 0, pε justifies the strategy σU , so that for
every b ∈ Suppt(σU):
b ∈ arg max
d∈ Ext(BU )
Et[d | pε]⇐⇒ Et[b | pε] ≥ Et[d | pε] ∀ d ∈ Ext(BU)
⇐⇒ βEt[b | pε] ≥ βEt[d | pε] ∀ d ∈ Ext(BU)
⇐⇒ Et[b∗ | pε] ≥ Et[d∗ | pε] ∀ d∗ ∈ Ext(BV )
⇐⇒ b∗ ∈ arg max
d∗∈ Ext(BV )
Et[d
∗ | pε].
We have therefore proven that if b ∈ Suppt(σU) when the election is held under
U , then b∗ = βUV b ∈ BRt(pε) when the election is held under V .
We can now conclude that σV is an equilibrium. Indeed, as the scores under
both σU and σV coincide up to a homothetic transformation, the pivot probability
vector pε satisfies the ordering condition for strategy σV for any ε > 0. Furthermore,
by definition, σU(b
∗ | t) > 0. Additionally, as b ∈ Suppt(σU), then b∗ ∈ BRt(pε).
Therefore, σV is an equilibrium when the election is held under V .
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As the f function is bijective, it can be proven similarly that if σV is an equilib-
rium under V , then σU is an equilibrium under U . In other words, if there exists an
homothetic transformation between Ext(BU) and Ext(BV ), the set of extremal equi-
libria under both U and V are equivalent. But the previous equivalence finishes the
proof as, by Proposition 1, any interior equilibrium under a voting rule is equivalent
to an extremal equilibrium under the same voting rule.
Theorem 1 has the advantage of being extremely simple to use: indeed, as will
be shown by section 5, almost no computation is needed to check the strategic
equivalence of two voting rules.
4.3 A Necessary Condition for the Strategic Equivalence of
Rank Scoring Rules
A natural question to ask is whether the previous sufficient condition for strategic
equivalence is also necessary. We only have a partial answer to this technically
challenging question. We prove that the condition is necessary if we restrict the
analysis to rank scoring rules.
Theorem 2. Let U and V be two rank scoring rules. If U and V are strategi-
cally equivalent, then there exists a homothetic transformation between their sets of
extremal ballots.
First notice that two rank scoring rules are homothetic if and only if they are
identical once re-scaled between 0 and 1. Within the proof, we uniquely consider
re-scaled rank scoring rules w.l.o.g. due to Theorem 1. The proof of the theorem
is presented in the next paragraphs. We start by the case of three candidates and
then generalize the argument.
Three candidates. Take a scoring rule U with weights (1, s2, 0). Let the pivot
vector pε = (pεij)ij∈H satisfy p
ε
12 = p
ε
13 = ε and p
ε
23 = ε
2.
Suppose that there are three possible types of voters in the election: the ones
who prefer c1 to c2 and c2 to c3, the ones who prefer c3 to c1 and c1 to c2 and finally
the ones who prefer c2 to c3 and c3 to c1. All voters assign a utility of 10 to their
first candidate, a utility of 5 to their middle candidate and no utility to their least
preferred one. We denote by βi the share of voters who rank candidate c1 in the i
th
position; it follows that β3 = 1 − β1 − β2. Given the pivot probabilities, one can
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easily check that the voters’ best responses are sincere so that they assign a higher
weight to a more preferred candidate than to a less preferred one.
Given these best responses, the scores of the candidates are the following ones:
S(c1) = β1 + β2s2;
S(c2) = β1s2 + (1− β1 − β2);
S(c3) = β2 + (1− β1 − β2)s2.
Letting β∗2 = β
∗
1
2s2−1
2−s2 +
1−s2
2−s2 and β
∗
1 > 1/3 leads to S(c1) > S(c2) = S(c3) which
is compatible with the ordering of pivot of probabilities. In other words, given the
type distribution β∗ and the pivot probabilities vector, there exists an equilibrium
under the voting rule U . Take now another rank scoring rule V with weights (1, s′2, 0)
and w.l.o.g. assume that s′2 > s2. Given the type distribution is β
∗ and the pivot
vector, the best responses are identical as in V so that the score vector S ′ satisfies
S ′(c2) = β∗1s
′
2 + (1− β∗1 − β∗2);
S ′(c3) = β∗2 + (1− β∗1 − β∗2)s′2.
As β∗1 > 1/3, one can check that (1−β∗1−β∗2) < β∗1 . Hence, β∗1s′2 > (1−β∗1−β∗2)s′2 so
that S ′(c2) > S ′(c3). These scores are in contradiction with pε12 = p
ε
13 = ε entailing
that there is not a corresponding equilibrium when the election is held under V .
Therefore, we have proven the lack of strategic equivalence of rank scoring rules
for three candidates. We now prove the lack of strategic equivalence for any number
of candidates.
Multi-candidate elections. The proof proceeds as follows. We first construct
for any rank scoring rule U a type distribution and an equilibrium such that all
candidates but one get the same expected score. We then deduce from the previous
point that given the type distribution, this equilibrium does not exist under any
different rank scoring rule V . Therefore, the rules U and V are not strategically
equivalent.
Before proving the main claim, we introduce a lemma dealing with voters’ best
responses that will be useful throughout.
Say that a scoring ballot is sincere if it matches the voter’s ordinal preference:
Definition 6. A scoring rule ballot c is sincere for a t-voter if
ut(ci) > ut(cj) =⇒ si ≥ sj.
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Observe that under a rank scoring rule, if a voter has strict preferences, he has
a unique sincere ballot. The next lemma proves that, when all pivots are equally
likely, this sincere ballot is his unique best response.
Lemma 2. Assume that a voter has strict preferences over the candidates. If all
pivot probabilities are equal in an election held under a rank scoring rule, then the
unique best response for the voters is sincere.
Proof. Assume that all pivot probabilities are equal, i.e. pεij = ε for every ij ∈
H. Pick a scoring rule with weights (si)
k
i=1 and a voter with preferences ut(c1) >
ut(c2) > . . . > ut(ck). Hence, the sincere ballot for the t-voter is the ballot b
∗ =
(1, s2, s3, . . . , sk−1, 0). Let us now prove that the unique best response for t-voters is
ballot b∗. Take two integers m and n with m < n and denote by ρmn the vector in
Rk that assigns 1 point to coordinate m, -1 point to coordinate n and 0 to the rest
of coordinates. Due to (1), we can write that
Et[ρ
mn | pε] =
∑
ij∈H
(ρmni − ρmnj ) · pij · [ut(ci)− ut(cj)].
Note that as pεij = ε for every ij ∈ H, we can remove the pivot probabilities as
they do not affect the sign of the expected utility so that Et[ρ
mn |pε] =∑ij∈H(ρmni −
ρmnj ) · [ut(ci) − ut(cj)]. As ρmnm = 1, ρmnn = −1 and ρmnj = 0 for any j 6= m,n, it
follows that
Et[ρ
mn | pε] = k[ut(cm)− ut(cn)].
Denote by µl the ballot that assigns 1 point to candidate l and no points to the rest
of the candidates. Using the previous equality, we can set up a complete preference
order over the different ballots µl for the t-voters. Indeed, as by definition, ut(c1) >
ut(c2) > . . . > ut(ck), it follows that
Et[µ1 | pε] > Et[µ2 | pε] > . . . > Et[µk | pε].
Therefore, the t-voters’ best response is the one that assigns the highest weight to
candidate 1, the second highest weight to candidate 2, and so on which actually
coincides with the definition of sincere ballot under a scoring rule, concluding the
proof.
Equipped with this lemma, we continue with the proof of Theorem 2 for multi-
candidate elections. Assume that the voters anticipate that all pivots in which
candidate c1 is not involved are equally likely and that they are infinitely less likely
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than the ones involving candidate c1. Formally, assume that the pivot probabilities
are ordered as follows:
pε1j = ε if j 6= 1 and pεij = ε2 for every i, j 6= 1. (3)
Let the voters’ preferences be strict and the number of types be equal to k,
the number of candidates. We denote each type by ti in which i stands for the
rank assigned by voters to candidate c1. Moreover, all voters rank candidate cj+1
immediately after candidate cj if possible.
In other words, the cardinal preferences of a ti-voter, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, satisfy
uti(ck−i+2) > . . . > uti(ck) > uti(c1) > uti(c2) > . . . > uti(ck−i+1),
in which ci = ci−k if i > k.
Given the order of the probabilities, the unique best response for both t1 and
tk-voters is to vote sincerely. Indeed, following Lemma 2, voters’ best responses
are sincere if all pivot probabilities are equal. Even though it is not the case here,
sincerity follows from candidate c1 being either the first or the worst choice for all
these voters combined with the fact that all pivot probabilities in which c1 is not
involved are equal. It hence follows that these voters assign 1 point to c1. Moreover,
the weights assigned to the rest of the candidates hinge only on the pivots in which
c1 is involved (the rest of the pivots being infinitely less likely) and, as they are all
equal, the logic of Lemma 2 applies.
As far as the other voters are concerned, the logic of Lemma 2 does not apply
directly, and one needs to specify some utility levels to ensure that the unique best
response is sincere. Indeed, a ti-voter with ti 6= t1, tk has candidate ck−i+2 as his
most preferred alternative, c1 in the i
th position and ck−i+1 as his least preferred
alternative. As for the case of t1 and tk voters, their best response is sincere if we
restrict the analysis to the weights assigned to all the candidates but c1. Indeed, as
all the pivot probabilities in which c1 is involved are equal, the logic of Lemma 2
applies. However, whether it is in their interest to be sincere when considering also
the weight assigned to c1 depends on their cardinal utility.
As previously defined, ρ1n stands for the vector in Rk that assigns 1 point to
coordinate 1, -1 point to coordinate n and 0 to the rest of the coordinates. In order
to ensure that their unique best response is sincere, it must be the case that for
any ti-voter with ti 6= t1, tk, there exists an εˆ > 0 such that for any ε in (0, εˆ), the
following inequalities hold:
Eti [ρ
1n | pε] > 0 for n ∈ {2, . . . , k − i+ 1},
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and
Eti [ρ
1n | pε] < 0 for n ∈ {k − i+ 2, . . . , k}.
Given the sequence of pivot probabilities (3), one can check that
lim
ε→0
Eti [ρ
1n | pε]
ε
= kuti(c1)− uti(cn)−
k∑
j=2
uti(cj).
Hence, in order to ensure that the unique best response for ε small is sincere, it
suffices to assume that
uti(c2) +
∑k
j=2 uti(cj)
k
< uti(c1) <
uti(ck) +
∑k
j=2 uti(cj)
k
,
as ck is ranked immediately above c1 and c2 is ranked immediately below. We
therefore assume that the previous inequality holds for every ti-voter with ti 6= t1, tk.
Let βi denote the share of ti-voters who rank candidate c1 on the i
th position.
Note that the numbers βi can be chosen independently the ones from the others
with the constraint that their sum equals one.
Take a rank scoring rule U with weights (si)
k
i=1. As the rank scoring rule is
re-scaled, s1 = 1 and sk = 0. Assume that the pivot probabilities are ordered as in
(3) so that voters’ best responses are sincere.
Let sˆ stand for the extension of the voting weights (si)
k
i=1 for any positive integer
i as follows :
sˆi =
{
si if 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
si = si−k if i > k.
Given the best responses, the score vector S is as follows:
S(c1) =
k∑
i=1
βisˆi;
S(c2) =
k∑
i=1
βisˆi+1;
. . . = . . .
S(cj) =
k∑
i=1
βisˆi+j−1;
. . . = . . .
S(ck) =
k∑
i=1
βisˆi+k−1.
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The sequence of pivot probabilities (3) is only compatible with the scores of
candidates being ordered as S(c1) ≥ S(c2) = . . . = S(ck).
Given the previous system of equations, we can write that S(cj) = S(cj+1) for
any j ≥ 2 if and only if
k∑
i=1
βi(sˆi+j−1 − sˆi+j) = 0.
Moreover, S(c1) ≥ S(c2) holds when
∑k
i=1 βi(sˆi − sˆi+1) ≥ 0.
Note that the equality among all candidates holds when βi =
1
k
for every i (a
Condorcet cycle exists under such a distribution). Therefore, as there are k − 1
variables (βi for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 as
∑
i βi = 1), k − 2 equations and one inequality,
there exists a continuum of solutions. For the rest of type distributions for which
the equilibrium is ensured, the type distribution satisfies β1 > 1/k which moreover
implies that :
β1 > βi for any i 6= 1,
when some si 6= 1.
Now, take two different scoring rules U and V with associated weights (si)
k
i=1 and
(s′i)
k
i=1. Take a type distribution β
∗ under which the previously described equilibrium
under U exists. We shall prove that the equilibrium under U corresponds to no
equilibrium under V , and hence that both rules are not strategically equivalent.
The proof is by contradiction and is divided in three different cases labeled a, b1,
b2.
a. Suppose first that they differ by one term, say sl 6= s′l and sj = s′j for any j 6= l.
Consider the type distribution β∗ and the sequence of pivot probabilities (3). The
best responses are identical under both U and V . Note that the t1-voters assign sl
points to cl. If we denote by S
′ the score vector under V , we have
S ′(cl)− S(cl) = β∗1(s′l − sl),
and for any ci 6= cl,
S ′(cj)− S(cj) = β∗i0(s′l − sl),
with i0 such that io + j− 1 = l. As by construction β∗1 > β∗j for any j 6= 1, it follows
that S ′(cl) − S(cl) > S ′(cj) − S(cj) for any cj 6= c1. Hence, candidate cl has the
second highest score, in contradiction with the sequence of pivot probabilities (3).
b. Suppose now that the weights of U and V differ by more than one term, say
si 6= s′i for any i ∈ I ⊆ K and sj = s′j for any j 6∈ I.
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b.1 Suppose first that the cardinal of I equals 2. W.l.o.g. take I = {c2, c3}. With the
type distribution β∗ and the sequence of pivot probabilities (3), the best responses
are identical under both U and V . Hence, we can write that
S ′(c2)− S(c2) = β∗1(s′2 − s2) + β∗2(s′3 − s3),
and
S ′(c3)− S(c3) = β∗1(s′3 − s3) + β∗k(s′2 − s2).
Moreover, if there is an equilibrium under V equivalent to the one described under
U , it must be the case that S ′(c2)− S(c2) = S ′(c3)− S(c3). However, this equality
is equivalent to:
β∗1(s
′
2 − s2 + s3 − s′3) = β∗k(s′2 − s2) + β∗2(s3 − s′3). (4)
However, as β∗1 > β
∗
i for any i 6= 1, it follows that:
β∗k(s
′
2 − s2) + β∗2(s3 − s′3) < β∗1(s′2 − s2) + β∗1(s3 − s′3) = β∗1(s′2 − s2 + s3 − s′3),
which contradicts (4).
b.2 Suppose finally that the cardinal of I equals 3, the rest of the cases being
analogous. W.l.o.g. take I = {c2, c3, c4}. With the type distribution β∗ and the
sequence of pivot probabilities (3), the best responses are identical under both U
and V . Hence, we can write that
S ′(c2)− S(c2) = β∗1(s′2 − s2) + β∗2(s′3 − s3) + β∗3(s′4 − s4),
and
S ′(c3)− S(c3) = β∗1(s′3 − s3) + β∗2(s′4 − s4) + β∗k(s′2 − s2).
If there is an equilibrium under V equivalent to the one described under U , we must
that S ′(c2)− S(c2) = S ′(c3)− S(c3). However, this equality implies that:
β∗1(s
′
2 − s2 + s3 − s′3) = β∗2(s3 − s′3) + β∗k(s′2 − s2) + β∗3(s4 − s′4) + β∗2(s′4 − s4). (5)
As β∗1 > β
∗
i for any i 6= 1, the right-hand side of (5) is strictly lower than
β∗1(s3 − s′3) + β∗1(s′2 − s2) + β∗1(s4 − s′4) + β∗1(s′4 − s4) < β∗1(s′2 − s2 + s3 − s′3),
entailing a contradiction with (5).
We can therefore conclude that any two scoring rules with different weights lead
to different equilibria given the same pivot probabilities vector and hence are not
strategically equivalent.
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5 Applications
Two applications of Theorem 1 are now described. The main interest of such a
theorem is that it allows to “simplify” voting rules, in which the term simplify has
been coined by the recent literature on mechanism simplification6. In this literature,
a mechanism is simplified by reducing the message space of the agents, while no new
equilibria are created as a consequence of this reduction. When the number of voters
becomes large enough, adding or removing interior ballots to a voting rule does not
modify the set of voting equilibria. Our results hence prove that when the number
of voters is large enough, many voting rules can be simplified.
5.1 Evaluative Voting: One man, Many extended votes
Under Evaluative Voting with m points, a voter can assign up to m points to each
candidate, for some positive m. Its set of abstention ballots equals Abs(BEVm) =
{(0, . . . , 0), (m, . . . ,m)}. Hence, as AV is a particular case of EV m, the set of
abstention ballots of AV equals Abs(BAV ) = {(0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1)}.
Corollary 1. For any finite m, EV m and AV are strategically equivalent.
Proof. Note that the set of extremal ballots of AV is not modified by normalizing
the rule as it satisfies
Ext(BAV ) = {0, 1}k \ {(0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1)}.
The same claim applies to the extremal ballots of EV m as it equals
Ext(BEVm) = {0,m}k \ {(0, . . . , 0), (m, . . . ,m)},
so that, by Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, EV m and AV are strategically equivalent.
5.2 Cumulative Voting: One man, One extended vote
In an election held under Cumulative Voting with m points, a voter can assign up
to m points to each candidate for some positive m with the restriction that the sum
of the points he can assign to each of the candidates is at most m. Hence, its set of
abstention ballots equals:
Abs(BCVm) = {(0, . . . , 0), (1, 1, . . . , 1), . . . , (bm
k
c, . . . , bm
k
c)},
6See Milgrom (2009, 2010) [19, 20] and Perez-Richet (2011) [29].
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with bxc being the largest integer lower than x. PV is a particular case of CV m
with m = 1 and hence its set of abstention ballots equals Abs(BPV ) = {(0, . . . , 0)}
as b 1
k
c = 0 for any k.
Corollary 2. For any finite m, CV m and PV are strategically equivalent.
Proof. Given the set of ballots under PV and CV m, one obtains that Ext(BPV )
consists of all the permutations of (1, 0, . . . , 0)} and that Ext(BCVm) consists of all
the permutations of (1, 0, . . . , 0)}. Since the set of extremal ballots is not affected
by normalization, Theorem 1, concludes the proof.
Even though we have proven that CV m and PV are strategically equivalent, we
have remained silent over the set of possible winners in an election. To do so, we
give a proposition which extends a previous result of De Sinopoli (2000) [8] (which
focused in Plurality Voting with perfect equilibrium a` la Selten) to the Myerson-
Weber setting. We show that any candidate who is not a Condorcet loser can win
the election under Cumulative Voting and hence under Plurality voting.
Prior to stating it, we need the definition of Condorcet loser. For any pair of
candidates ci, cj ∈ K, let V (i, j) = {t ∈ T | ut(ci) > ut(cj)} be the set of types
where candidate ci is strictly preferred to candidate cj. The Condorcet Loser of the
election is defined as:
Definition 7. A candidate ci is called the Condorcet Loser of the election if∑
t∈V (i,j)
r(t) < 1/2 ∀ cj ∈ K, cj 6= ci.
Proposition 3. Assume that voters have strict preferences. For every positive m,
in an election held under CV m, for every candidate ci who is not a Condorcet loser
there exists an equilibrium in which ci wins the election with positive probability.
We provide a proof for completeness. The idea of the proof is standard and
identical to the proofs for PV in similar settings (De Sinopoli (2000) [8] and Myerson
(2002) [23]).
Proof. Let c1 and c2 be two candidates. As voters have strict preferences, we di-
vide the voters in two groups: the voters who prefer candidate c1 to candidate
c2, V (1, 2) = {t ∈ T | ut(c1) > ut(c2)}, and the remaining ones V (2, 1) = {t ∈
T | ut(c2) > ut(c1)}. We suppose that
∑
t∈V (1,2) r(t) >
∑
t∈V (2,1) r(t) (in case of an
equality a similar claim applies). Under CV m, a voter can assign up to m points
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to a single candidate. Consider the strategy σ(· | t) such that every t-voter with
t ∈ V (1, 2) assigns m points to c1, i.e.
σ((m, 0, . . . , 0) | t) = 1,
and such that every t′-voter with t′ ∈ V (2, 1) assigns m points to c2,
σ((0,m, . . . , 0) | t′) = 1,
Therefore, the winner of the election is candidate 1 given σ. This equilibrium is
supported, for any ε > 0, by any pivot probability vector pε = (pεij)ij∈H that satisfies
two constraints. First, the limit when ε tends towards zero of the conditional pivot
probability vector qε satisfies q12 = 1 and qij = 0 with ij 6= 12. Second, for any
candidate cl 6= c1, c2 and for any ε > 0, pε2l ≤ εpε1l in order to satisfy the ordering
condition for ε. Given such a pivot probability vector, voters expect that, in the
event of a pivot, the most probable pivot occurs candidates c1 and c2, the ones with
the highest scores. Voters that prefer 1 to 2 assign the highest score to 1 and similarly
for the voters that prefer c2 to c1. Indeed, take a t-voter with t ∈ V (1, 2). His
expected utility gain equals Et[(b1, b2, . . . , bk)|pε] =
∑
ij∈H(bi−bj)·pεij ·[ut(ci)−ut(cj)].
As q = (1, 0, . . . , 0), we can write that Et[(b1, b2, . . . , bk)|p] = (b1−b2)[ut(c1)−ut(c2)].
Under CV m, the ballot for which b1 − b2 is maximized is (m, 0, . . . , 0). Hence, as in
the rest of the ballots under CV m, the difference b1 − b2 is strictly lower than m,
we have BRt(p) = {(m, 0, . . . , 0)} for a t-voter with t ∈ V (1, 2). A similar argument
applies for t′-voters with t′ ∈ V (2, 1), concluding the proof.
6 Small Elections
The results previously presented are a consequence of the model used in which
voters’ perceptions over the impact of their ballots in switching the winner of the
election have a very specific shape. Such a theory fits particularly well the study
of mass elections. Indeed, as shown by further developments of the theory7, more
formal models give, roughly speaking, similar predictions depending on whether the
ordering condition is satisfied. However, it seems that the specific shape of expected
utility is not particularly relevant for studying voting in committees (that is voting
with few voters). Indeed, in a committee, the information a voter knows can be
much more detailed than in a large election.
7See Myerson (2002) [23], Laslier (2009) [16], Nu´n˜ez (2009) [27], Bouton and Castanheira (2012)
[4], Goertz and Maniquet (2011) [12], and Nun˜ez (2010) [26].
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In order to prove that non-extremal voting may be the unique best response in a
voting game with few voters, we present an example. In order to test the robustness
of the example, we focus on trembling-hand perfection a` la Selten.
Let us recall that each voter chooses from a ballot set B. Letting Bn stand for the
product ballot set, we let ∆0(Bn) denote the set of all probability distributions over
Bn which give positive probability to all members of Bn. Hence a strategy profile
σN ∈ ∆0(Bn) is a completely mixed strategy profile in the game (N ,B, T ,K). The
definition of perfection is as follows:
Definition 8. A completely mixed strategy profile σεN is an ε-perfect equilibrium in
the game (N ,B, T ,K) if
∀i ∈ N , ∀bi, b¯i ∈ B, if Ui(bi, σεN\{i}) > Ui(b¯i, σεN\{i}), with σε(b¯i) ≤ ε,
in which Ui(b) denotes the payoff of voter i given the strategy combination b. We
refer to the strategy combination σN as a perfect equilibrium if there exists a sequence
{σεN} of ε-perfect equilibria converging (for ε→ 0) to σN .
Example 2.
There are three candidatesK = {c1, c2, c3} and four different types T = {a, b, c, d},
with cardinal utilities given by:
ua = (6, 1, 0), ub = (0, 6, 1), uc = (0, 1, 6) and ud = (0, 3, 6).
There are seven voters in the electorate. Voters 1,2 and 3 have type a, voters 4 and
5 have type b, voter 6 has type c and voter 7 has type d .
We consider EV 2, that is Evaluative Voting in which voters can give up to two
points to each of the candidates.
We let g denote the strategy combination
g = ((2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 1), (0, 2, 1), (0, 0, 2), g7).
in which g7 stands for the mixed strategy 1/3(0, 0, 2) + 1/3(0, 1, 2) + (1/3)(0, 2, 2)
of voter 7. Every voter plays an undominated strategy in the strategy combination
g. It is easy to check that g is a mixed-strategy equilibrium of the election in which
voters 1 to 6 are playing a unique best response.
Proposition 4. In Example 2, g is a perfect equilibrium in which some voters’
unique best responses are not extremal when the election is held under EV 2.
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Remark 3. Formula (1) is not verified in a perfect equilibrium in small elections.
The source of the non extremal behavior in this example is clearly the uncertainty
faced by voters 4 and 5, as a consequence of the mixing of voter 7. The same logic
applies in a (Bayesian) game of incomplete information in which voters are not sure
of the type of their opponents.
Remark 4. The utility vectors are consistent with single-peaked preferences.
7 Conclusion
Building on the theory of strategic voting in large elections, we have derived sufficient
and necessary conditions for the strategic equivalence of additive voting rules that
simply depend on the ballots available to the voters. The sufficient condition says
that whenever two voting rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to a
homothetic transformation), then they are strategically equivalent. This condition
is proven to be necessary for the strategic equivalence of rank scoring rules.
Furthermore, the sufficient condition helps us to draw some conclusions about
how adding ballots to a given voting rule modifies the set of voting equilibria. We
set up a distinction between extensions of voting rules: completions (adding interior
ballots) and enrichments (adding at least one extremal ballot). Whereas all voting
rules are robust to completion, it might be the case than an enrichment modifies the
set of equilibria of a voting rule. Using this distinction, we prove that it is possi-
ble to add ballots to both Plurality Voting and Approval Voting without modifying
the set of voting equilibria. In the case of Approval Voting, there is no difference
between EV m (for any m) and AV when voters act strategically. As far as PV is
concerned, Cumulative Voting (CV m for any m) extends PV but remains strate-
gically equivalent to PV . Nevertheless, the possibilities of expression seem to be
somehow bounded for the following reason. Consider a voting rule which allows at
most M points. If one wishes to enlarge the possibilities of expression of voters by
adding new ballots while respecting the same constraint, one can at best propose
EV M . But, the rule EV M is strategically equivalent to EV 1, which is AV . As has
been shown, the previous results do not extend to a context with a reduced number
of voters.
We have very few observations to back up, or to invalidate, these theoretical
results. Laslier and Van der Straeten (2004) [15] report on an experiment comparing
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EV with the 0 to 10 scale and AV , and Baujard and Igersheim (2010) [2] and
Baujard et al. (2010) [1] report on experiments comparing the use of EV under
various scales, including AV . It is observed that the outcome of the election (the
elected candidate) tends to be the same under different systems, even if it is not
observed that voters concentrate on extreme grades.
An interesting extension of the present work would be to understand whether
similar results apply under proportional representation or in multi-seat elections in
which voters have to distribute their votes.
A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
The first step of the proof consists in showing that g is a mixed strategy equilib-
rium. To do so, we compute the probability, under g, of each pivot outcome a
player can face and, from these probabilities, the expected utility derived from each
undominated strategy.
Voters 1,2,3
Even though the best responses are explained for the voter 1, the reasoning is
analogous for voters 2 and 3.
p((4, 4, 6) | g−1) = 1/3
p((4, 5, 6) | g−1) = 1/3
p((4, 6, 6) | g−1) = 1/3.
From the pivot probabilities previously described, we have
U1(2, 0, 0) = 25/9
U1(2, 1, 0) = 19/9
U1(2, 2, 0) = 13/9.
which entails that (2, 0, 0) is the unique best response for voter 1.
Voters 4,5
Voter 4’s best responses are analyzed, the reasoning being analogous for the
voter 5.
p((6, 2, 5) | g−4) = 1/3
p((6, 3, 5) | g−4) = 1/3
p((6, 4, 5) | g−4) = 1/3.
From the pivot probabilities previously described, we have
U4(0, 2, 0) = 1
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U4(0, 2, 1) = 10/9
U4(0, 2, 2) = 1.
implying that (0, 2, 1) is the unique best response for voter 4.
Voter 6
The most probable pivot outcomes faced by voter 6 are as follows
p((6, 4, 4) | g−6) = 1/3
p((6, 5, 4) | g−6) = 1/3
p((6, 6, 4) | g−6) = 1/3
From the pivot probabilities previously described, we have
U6(0, 0, 2) = 25/9
U6(0, 1, 2) = 19/9
U6(0, 2, 2) = 13/9.
implying that (0, 0, 2) is the unique best response for voter 6.
Voter 7
The most probable pivot outcome faced by voter 7 is the event (6, 4, 4). Due
to her utility profile, voter 7 strictly prefers to use an undominated strategy and is
indifferent among all of them: that is (0, 0, 2), (0, 1, 2), (0, 2, 2). Hence, the mixed
strategy g7 is a best response.
The second step of the proof consists in showing that g is a perfect equilibrium.
To do so, consider the following completely mixed strategy combination gε, where
ηi denotes the mixed strategy of voter i which assigns equal probability to all his
pure strategies.
i = 1,2,3 gεi = (1− 27ε2)(2, 0, 0) + 27ε2ηi
i = 4,5 gεi = (1− 27ε2)(0, 2, 1) + 27ε2ηi
i = 6 gεi = (1− ε− 27ε2)(0, 0, 2) + ε(0, 1, 2) + 27ε2ηi,
i = 7 gεi = g7 + 27ε
2ηi.
It is easy to see that, for ε sufficiently close to zero, this is an ε-perfect equilib-
rium. Suppose all voters other than i choose the strategies prescribed by g. Since
for ε going to zero, the probability of voter 6 to tremble towards (0, 1, 2) is infinitely
greater than the probability of any other mistake, it is enough to check that the
limiting strategy is preferred to the other undominated strategy when either this
mistake or no mistake at all occurs.
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For voters 1 to 5, the relevant contingency is the one described by the limiting
strategy g. Indeed, as has been shown, their unique best response is the one depicted
by g as when the trembles tends towards, they have a unique best response. For
voter 6, the same argument applies.
Finally, one can deduce that for voter i = 7 casting the mixed strategy ballot
g7 is a best response, against g
ε. Indeed, for voter 7, the relevant contingency are
summarized by the vectors (6, 4, 4) and (6, 5, 4). Let us denote their probabilities
by p((6, 4, 4) | f ε−i) and p((6, 6, 4) | f ε−i). Since
U7(0, 0, 2) = 3p((6, 4, 4) | f ε−i) + 3p((6, 5, 4) |f ε−i)
= U7(0, 1, 2), U7(0, 2, 2).
the mixed strategy g7 is a best reply to g
ε
−i.
Hence, {gε} is a sequence of ε-perfect equilibria. Since g is the limit of gε, it is
a perfect equilibrium in which voters’ best responses are not extremal.
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